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Abstract—This paper extends the idea of specializing modified
interpreters for systematically generating obfuscated code. By
using the Coq proof assistant we specify some elementary
obfuscations and prove that the resulting distorted interpreter is
correct, namely it preserves the intended semantics of programs.
The paper shows how the semantic preservation proofs generated
and verified in Coq can provide a measure of the quality of
the obfuscation. In particular we can observe that there is a
precise corresponding between the potency of the obfuscation
and the complexity of the proof of semantics preservation.
Our obfuscation can be easily integrated into the CompCert C
compiler, providing the basis for a formally verified obfuscating
compiler which can be applied to any C program.
I. INTRODUCTION
Code obfuscation is emerging as a key asset in security
by obscurity, in particular for intellectual property protection
and for hiding secrets (e.g., keys or watermarks) in source
or compiled code [1]. Results on the impossibility of perfect
and universal obfuscation, such as [2], did not dishearten
researchers and practitioners in developing methods and al-
gorithms for hiding sensitive information in programs (see [3]
for a comprehensive survey). In particular, in contrast with
cryptography which provides provably secure certificates, the
lack of a provably secure obfuscation method has pushed
the interest in designing obfuscating algorithms that resist
to attacks for a sufficient amount of time to keep valid the
secret until a new version of the same software is released.
Among the grand challenges in code obfuscation addressed
in [4], the systematic and possibly automatic generation of
obfuscated code plays a key role. This is largely due to the
necessity of producing highly diversified code in a relatively
small range of time, in order to foil any attempt to break code
security. In this context, software diversity [5] in conjunction
with code obfuscation may result in a winning strategy for
code protection, providing different immunity to hide vulner-
abilities and enforcing that each instance of the code must be
attacked separately, dramatically increasing the effort required
for hackers to develop automated attack tools [3]. Successful
obfuscation should therefore implement meaningful diversity,
and be able to generate diversified obfuscated code quickly
enough for comparative evaluation.
Recently in [6], the authors introduced a systematic and
automatic method for generating diversified and obfuscated
code by partial evaluation of distorted interpreters. The idea
is based on the fact that obfuscating is making an approximate
(abstract) interpreter imprecise (incomplete) [7]. Program
understanding is indeed deeply connected with the notion of
interpretation. Human in Man-At-The-End (MATE) attacks
or automatic program analysis tools employed in reverse
engineering are all based on interpreting program execution
(control and data flow) in order to understand its behavior and
extract its properties. Therefore, obfuscating is distorting the
attacker in order to deceive its interpretation. In [6] this is
implemented by designing a distorted interpreter for the given
programming language such that when it is partially evaluated
with respect to the input program P it returns a transformed
program Q which is semantically equivalent to P yet inheriting
the programming style of the distorted interpreter. Interpreter
distortion can be done by making residual in the specialization
process sufficiently many interpreter operations to defeat an
attacker in extracting sensible information from transformed
code. In particular, the distortion is in such a way that a
given attacker, which is an abstract interpreter (see [8]), loses
information in analyzing Q [7]. The use of abstract interpreta-
tion provides a model for the attacker which is parametric on
its ability to extract properties about program behavior, i.e.,
its precision. This approach has the advantage of specifying
code protection by obfuscation as a two player game that
turns around the notion of interpretation: The attacker is an
approximate interpreter that is devoted to extract properties
of the behavior of a program and the defender disguises
sensitive properties by distorting code interpretation, making
the attacker blind.
In this paper we go beyond this construction and specify
both the standard (attacking) and the distorted (protecting)
interpretation underlying a given obfuscation strategy inside
a theorem prover. We consider Coq [9], [10] as proof as-
sistant, providing a formal language to write mathematical
definitions, executable algorithms, and theorems together with
an environment for semi-interactive development of machine-
checked proofs. The advantage of this approach is twofold:
(1) it is possible to generate a provably correct distorted
interpreter that, once specialized, will return an obfuscated
program which is semantically equivalent to the original one
[11], and (2) the proof of correctness encodes precisely the
efforts that an attacker has to make in order to de-obfuscate
the program. We show this by three simple examples dealing
with data-obfuscation [12] and layout obfuscation by variable
renaming in a simple imperative language called IMP. We
observe that the while the structure of the equivalence proof
in the case of layout obfuscation is straightforward, this is
Arithmetic expr.: a ::= id variable identifier
j n integer constant
j a1 + a2 addition
j a1 - a2 subtraction
j a1 * a2 multiplication
j a1 / a2 division
Boolean expr.: b ::= TRUE true value
j FALSE false value
j a1 == a2 equality test
j a1 <= a2 less or equal
j ! a negation
j b1 && b2 conjonction
Statements: s ::= skip empty statement
j id = a assignment
j s1;s2 sequence
j if(b) s1 else s2 conditional
j while(b) s while loop
Fig. 1. Abstract syntax of IMP (expressions and statements)
not the case in data-obfuscation. In particular the structure
of the lemmas necessary for proving semantics equivalence
between source and obfuscated code corresponds precisely
to the deep understanding of the de-obfuscation strategy,
which is straightforward in the case of layout obfuscation by
variable renaming. It is therefore possible to map obfuscating
algorithms and techniques into proofs in Coq, in such a way
that the more complex is the proof of semantics equivalence
and the more potent is the obfuscation. The results presented
in this paper are in this perspective preliminary towards the
development of a formally verified obfuscating compiler based
on the idea of obfuscating programs by distorting interpreters.
II. SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS OF IMP
IMP [13] is a classical small imperative language. It consists
of arithmetic and boolean expressions, and statements. Its
syntax is given in figure 1.
The dynamic semantics of IMP is written using a big-
step operational style. The semantics is defined by the 3
following judgements with respect to a memory M mapping
variables into values. The semantics rules are given in figures 2
(evaluation of expressions) and 3 (execution of statements).
` M;a : v (evaluation of arithmetic expressions)
` M;b : v (evaluation of boolean expressions)
` M;s +M0 (execution of statements)
In the following, for functions returning “option” types, bxc
(read: “some x”) corresponds to success with return value x,
and /0 (read: “none”) corresponds to failure. x? denotes an
optional occurrence of x.
Values: v 2 Z[Bool
Memory: M ::= id 7! v? map from variables to values
Update: M[id 7! v] =M0 update M with value v for id
Arithmetic expressions:
`M;n : n (1)
M(id) = bvc
(2)
`M; id : v
`M;a1 : v1 `M;a2 : v2 (3)
`M;a1 + a2 : v1+ v2
`M;a1 : v1 `M;a2 : v2 (4)
`M;a1   a2 : v1  v2
`M;a1 : v1 `M;a2 : v2 (5)
`M;a1  a2 : v1  v2
`M;a1 : v1 `M;a2 : v2 v2 6= 0 (6)
`M;a1 = a2 : v1=v2
Boolean expressions:
`M;TRUE : true (7) `M;FALSE : false (8)
`M;a1 : v1 `M;a2 : v2 v1 = v2 (9)
`M;a1 == a2 : true
`M;a1 : v1 `M;a2 : v2 v1 6= v2 (10)
`M;a1 == a2 : f alse
`M;a1 : v1 `M;a2 : v2 v1  v2 (11)
`M;a1 <= a2 : true
`M;a1 : v1 `M;a2 : v2 v1 > v2 (12)
`M;a1 <= a2 : f alse
`M;a : v
(13)
`M; ! a : negb(v)
`M;a1 : v1 `M;a2 : v2 (14)
`M;a1 && a2 : v1&v2
Fig. 2. Big-step semantics for IMP
III. OBFUSCATING INTEGER CONSTANTS
Given an obfuscation function called Oval : Z ! Z, this
obfuscation replaces every occurrence of an integer i by the
integer Oval(i). The Oval function is reversible. Its inverse
function is called Dval . We thus have the following axiom
called Axm 1: 8v;Dval(Oval(v)) = v.
The whole obfuscation is detailed in figure 4. The Oval
function is called by the Oaexp function during the obfuscation
of arithmetic expressions. Obfuscating a boolean expression
Statements:
`M;skip +M (15)
`M;a : v
(16)
`M;(id = a) +M[id 7! v]
`M;s1 +M1 `M1;s2 +M2 (17)
`M;(s1;s2) +M2
`M;b : true `M;s1 +M0 (18)
`M;if b then s1 else s2 +M0
`M;b : false `M;s2 +M0 (19)
`M;if b then s1 else s2 +M0
`M;b : false
(20)
`M;while(b)s +M
`M;b : true `M;s +M1 (21)
`M;while(b)s +M1
Fig. 3. Big-step semantics for IMP
consists only in obfuscting its arithmetic expressions. In the
same way, obfuscating a statement consists only in obfuscating
its expressions.
A. A first distorted semantics for IMP
As all integer values are modified by the obfuscation,
obfuscated values are stored in memory. Thus, a distorted
semantics is required to evaluate obfuscated programs (in an
obfuscated memory). The distorted semantics associated to the
obfuscation on integer constants is defined by the 3 following
judgements. They use values and memories that are defined
on top of figure 5.
` M;a 6 :v (distorted evaluation of arithmetic exp.)
` M;b 6 :v (distorted evaluation of boolean exp.)
` M;s 6 +M0 (distorted execution of statements)
The distorted semantic rules are detailed in figure 5. The only
difference with respect to the IMP semantics is in the evalua-
tion of binary expressions. In a binary arithmetic expression,
the binary operator is first applied to both deobfuscated values,
then the resulting value is obfuscated. In a binary boolean
expression, as integer values are obfuscated, these values
must be deobfuscated before applying any binary operator
comparing integer values. Boolean values are not obfuscated,
and thus they do not need to be deobfuscated.
Exactly as in the standard semantics, the execution of
statements relies on the evaluation of arithmetic and boolean
expressions.
B. Semantic preservation
The following theorems state that the integer obfuscation
preserves the semantics of arithmetic expressions: given a
Arithmetic expression obfuscation:
Oaexp(n) =Oval(n)
Oaexp(id) = id
Oaexp(a1a2) =Oaexp(a1)  Oaexp(a2)
 2 f+; ;;=g
Boolean expression obfuscation:
Obexp(TRUE) = TRUE
Obexp(FALSE) = FALSE
Obexp(a1  a2) =Oaexp(a1)oOaexp(a2)
 2 f==;<=g
Obexp(b1&&b2) =Obexp(b1)&Obexp(b2)
Obexp(!(b)) = !Obexp(b)
Statement obfuscation:
Ostmt(SKIP) = SKIP
Ostmt(id = a) = (id =Oaexp(a))
Ostmt(s1 ; s2) =Oaexp(s1) ; Oaexp(s2)
Ostmt(if (b) then s1 = if (Obexp(b)) then
else s2) Ostmt(s1)
else Ostmt(s2)
Ostmt(while (b)s) = while (Obexp(b))
Ostmt(s)
Fig. 4. Integer encoding
memory M and an expression a, if a evaluates to a value
v wrt. M in the standard semantics, then in the distorted
semantics, the corresponding obfuscated expression evaluates
to the corresponding obfuscated value in the corresponding
obfuscated memory. In this theorem, the Omem function obfus-
cates each value in memory using the Oval function defined
in the previous section. Its inverse function is called Dmem.
Thm 1: `M;a : v ) ` Omem(M);Oaexp(a) 6 :Oval(v)
Reciprocally, given a memory M and an expression a, if
a evaluates to a value v wrt. M in the distorted semantics,
then in the standard semantics, the corresponding deobfuscated
expression evaluates to the corresponding deobfuscated value
in the corresponding deobfuscated memory.
Thm 2: `M;a 6 :v ) `Dmem(M);Daexp(a) :Dval(v)
Let us note that we could have written the two previous
theorems as the following theorem. In the sequel of this paper,
we will use theorems such as the following one to state the
semantic preservation of an obfuscation.
Thm 3: `M;a : v , ` Omem(M);Oaexp(a) 6 :Oval(v)
In the same way, both of the following theorems state that
the integer obfuscation preserves the semantics of boolean
expressions and statements.
Thm 4: `M;b : v , ` Omem(M);Obexp(b) 6 :Oval(v)
Thm 5: `M;s +M0 , ` Omem(M);Ostmt(s) 6 +Omem(M0)
The proof that the integer obfuscation preserves the seman-
tics proceeds classically by induction on the execution relation.
This proof relies on the following intermediate lemmas. The
first lemma relates a memory and its corresponding obfuscated
Arithmetic expressions:
`M;n 6 :n (22)
M(id) = bvc
(23)
`M; id 6 :v
`M;a1 6 :v1 `M;a2 6 :v2 (24)
`M;a1 + a2 6 :Oval(Dval(v1)+Dval(v2))
`M;a1 6 :v1 `M;a2 6 :v2 (25)
`M;a1   a2 6 :Oval(Dval(v1) Dval(v2))
`M;a1 6 :v1 `M;a2 6 :v2 (26)
`M;a1  a2 6 :Oval(Dval(v1)Dval(v2))
`M;a1 6 :v1 `M;a2 6 :v2 v2 6= 0 (27)
`M;a1 = a2 6 :Oval(Dval(v1)=Dval(v2))
Boolean expressions:
`M;TRUE 6 :true (28) `M;FALSE 6 :false (29)
`M;a1 6 :v1 `M;a2 6 :v2 Dval(v1) =Dval(v2) (30)
`M;a1 == a2 6 : true
`M;a1 6 :v1 `M;a2 6 :v2 Dval(v1) 6=Dval(v2) (31)
`M;a1 == a2 6 : f alse
`M;a1 6 :v1 `M;a2 6 :v2 Dval(v1)Dval(v2) (32)
`M;a1 <= a2 6 : true
`M;a1 6 :v1 `M;a2 6 :v2 Dval(v1)>Dval(v2) (33)
`M;a1 <= a2 6 : f alse
`M;a 6 :v
(34)
`M; ! a 6 :negb(v)
`M;a1 6 :v1 `M;a2 6 :v2 (35)
`M;a1 && a2 6 :v1&v2
Statements:
`M;skip 6 +M (36)
`M;a 6 :v
(37)
`M;(id = a) 6 +M[id 7! v]
`M;s1 6 +M1 `M1;s2 6 +M2 (38)
`M;(s1;s2) 6 +M2
`M;b 6 :false
(39)
`M;while(b)s 6 +M
`M;b 6 :true `M;s 6 +M1 (40)
`M;while(b)s 6 +M1
Fig. 5. Distorted semantics associated to integer constants obfuscation
memory.
Lm 6: M(id) = bvc , Omem(M)(id) = bOval(v)c
The next lemmas state that the sequencing between an
update in memory and an obfuscation (resp. a deobfuscation)
can be modified without changing memory.
Lm 7: Omem(M[id 7! v]) = Omem(M)[id 7! Oval(v)]
Lm 8: Dmem(M[id 7! v]) =Dmem(M)[id 7!Dval(v)]
It is worth noting the structure of intermediate lemmas 6–7.
They specify precisely the commuting property of obfuscation
and de-obfuscation with respect to the main semantic operators
and constructions of IMP (viz., memory, variable substitution
etc.). The understanding of these properties correspond indeed
precisely to the understanding of how the obfuscated program
is constructed out of its source version, and it is in this
perspective the core of any de-obfuscating interpretation.
IV. VARIABLE ENCODING
The second obfuscation is also a data-obfuscation as intro-
duced in [12] and it is defined in figure 6. In each expression
of a program, it replaces each occurrence of any variable id by
the arithmetic expression idn, where n is a constant such that
n> 0. The inverse (deobfuscation) function replaces an arith-
metic expression a by the arithmetic expression a=n. Thus, in
arithmetic expressions, only variables are obfuscated. Boolean
expressions are obfuscated as in the previous obfuscation, thus
the corresponding function is not shown in the figure.
In statements, only assign statements are obfuscated dif-
ferently (compared to the first obfuscation). In an assign
statement such as id = a, the expression a is obfuscated (i.e.
each occurence of each variable id is replaced by id  n)
and then the resulting expression is deobfuscated (i.e. the
expression is divided by n). Thus, the expression a remains
unchanged after the obfuscation only when there is only one
occurrence of a single variable in a. The left hand side of the
assign statement is never obfuscated.
A. Semantic preservation
No distorted semantics is required to evaluate obfuscated
expressions or to execute obfuscated programs: the semantics
preservation theorems rely only on the standard semantics of
IMP. As a consequence, another difference with respect to the
previous obfuscation is in both of the following main theorems
related to expressions: the value of an obfuscated expression
is also the value of the original expression.
Moreover, the proof of the theorem related to boolean ex-
pressions is exactly the same as the proof of the corresponding
theorem in the first obfuscation. As the specification language
of Coq is a higher-order functional language (and logic), the
Coq development is modular, and some proofs can be directly
reused.
Thm 9: `M;a : v , ` Omem(M);Oaexp(a) : v
Thm 10: `M;b : v , ` Omem(M);Obexp(b) : v
The theorem stating that the obfuscation of statements
preserves the semantics is the same as for the first obfuscation.
Thm 11: `M;s +M0 , `Omem(M);Ostmt(s) +Omem(M0)
Elementary obfuscation:
n 2 Z+
Ovar(id) = n id
Daexp(a) = a=n
Arithmetic expr. obfuscation:
Oaexp(n) = n
Oaexp(id) =Ovar(id)
Oaexp(a1a2) =Oaexp(a1)  Oaexp(a2)
 2 f+; ;;=g
Statement obfuscation:
Ostmt(SKIP) = SKIP
Ostmt(id = a) = (id =Daexp(Oaexp(a)))
Ostmt(s1 ; s2) =Ostmt(s1) ; Ostmt(s2)
Ostmt(if (b) then s1) = if (Obexp(b))
then Ostmt(s1)
else s2 else Ostmt(s2)
Ostmt(while (b)s) = while (Obexp(b))
Ostmt(s)
Fig. 6. Variable encoding: a first obfuscation of variables
Moreover, the only intermediate lemmas that are required
to prove the semantic preservation are those previously used
for the first obfuscation. Thus, no new intermediate lemma is
required here. This means that the two obfuscations are indeed
equivalent from the point of view of the necessary intermediate
lemmas in order to prove the equivalence of the source and
obfuscated code. Moreover, we can observe that the second
obfuscation is slightly better than the first one, because the
main theorem for expressions is not the expected theorem.
V. LAYOUT OBFUSCATION: RENAMING VARIABLES
Layout obfuscation is considered a straightforward obfus-
cation strategy [3]. It deals with the way code (variables
and statements) are written and it is, under this perspective,
relatively easy to de-obfuscate. Given an obfuscation function
Orename : ident! ident, this obfuscation renames in every
expression every occurrence of a variable identifier id into
Orename(id). The Orename function is reversible. Its inverse
function is called Drename. We thus have the following axiom
called Axm 2: 8v;Drename(Orename(v)) = v.
The obfuscation is detailed in figure 7. As in the first
obfuscation, the only obfuscations of a boolean expression or
a statement that is not an assignment are the obfuscations of
arithmetic expressions. Thus, the corresponding functions are
similar to those of figure 4, and they are not shown on figure 7.
A. A second distorted semantics for IMP
Variable renaming requires a distorted semantics that is
defined on figure 8. Its judgements are those of the previous
distorted semantics defined in figure 5. However both seman-
tics are different. Here, only the evaluation of a variable and
Arithmetic exp. obfuscation:
Oaexp(n) = n
Oaexp(id) = Orename(id)
Oaexp(a1a2) = Oaexp(a1)  Oaexp(a2)
 2 f+; ;;=g
Statement obfuscation:
Ostmt(id = a) = (Orename(id) = Oaexp(a))
Fig. 7. Variable renaming: a second obfuscation of variables
Arithmetic expressions:
`M;n : n (41)
M(Drename(id)) = bvc (42)
`M; id : v
`M;a1 : v1 `M;a2 : v2 (43)
`M;a1 + a2 : v1+ v2
`M;a1 : v1 `M;a2 : v2 (44)
`M;a1   a2 : v1  v2
`M;a1 : v1 `M;a2 : v2 (45)
`M;a1  a2 : v1  v2
`M;a1 : v1 `M;a2 : v2 v2 6= 0 (46)
`M;a1 = a2 : v1=v2
Assign statements:
`M;a 6 :v
(47)
`M;(Drename(id) = a) 6 +M[id 7! v]
Fig. 8. Distorted semantics associated to the renaming of variables
the execution of assignments are distorted to express that the
variable is deobfuscated before accessing the memory.
More precisely, the value of a renamed variable is the value
of the deobfuscated variable. In the same way, executing an
assignment updates the value of the deobfuscated variable.
As in the standard semantics, the evaluation of a boolean
expression relies on the evaluation of an arithmetic expression,
and the execution of other statements relies on the evaluation
of its expressions. Thus, the corresponding rules are not shown
in the figure.
B. Semantic preservation
Only variable occurences are renamed. The memory is not
obfuscated. Thus, the semantic preservation follows from the
three following theorems.
Thm 12: `M;a : v , `M;Oaexp(a) 6 :v
Thm 13: `M;b : v , `M;Obexp(b) 6 :v
Thm 14: `M;s +M0 , `M;Ostmt(s) 6 +M0
No intermediate lemma is required to prove the above theo-
rems. Only the axiom Axm 2 defined previously is required. In
this perspective, the Coq proof assistant does not need extra
knowledge in order to prove equivalence of the obfuscated
code relatively to the source one. This formally justifies the
intrinsic simplicity of variable renaming with respect to the
more sophisticated data-obfuscations developed above.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we have formally defined the semantics of
a simple imperative language as well as three elementary
obfuscations on this language. The idea is simple: use Coq
as a standardized proof assistant and provide within Coq a
proof of equivalence between source and obfuscated programs.
The comparison between the proofs provided by different
obfuscation methods gives a deep understanding of their
relative potency and effectiveness.
For two of these obfuscations, we have formally defined
a dedicated distorted semantics that foils the attacker. We
also have formally verified using the Coq proof assistant that
our obfuscations preserve the semantics of programs, and
we have given the intermediate lemmas that were required
for these proofs. Interestingly, these lemmas, as constructed
within the Coq proof assistant, specify precisely the intended
steps necessary for reversing the obfuscation. Therefore by
comparing the structure of the proofs of equivalence generated
within Coq it is possible to devise a qualitative measure for
the potency of the obfuscating transformation.
Our Coq development is modular, and therefore different
obfuscations can be combined in order to generate new
obfuscations. As future work, we intend to formalize more
obfuscations and to reuse parts of our distorted semantics
and of our proofs. In particular we are interested in mixing
elementary transformations in order to design more complex
obfuscations as the composition of simpler ones. This would
be particularly effective when context sensitive transforma-
tions, i.e., transformations that depend upon the structure of
data and control flow of the program, are combined. This
would result in a highly intricate control/data flow of the ob-
fuscated code, yet keeping semantics equivalence. Moreover,
it is relatively straightforward to extend our approach to the
obfuscation for the entire C language, by adapting proofs to
the semantics of the C language within the formally verified
CompCert C compiler [14]. CompCert is formally verified
using Coq. This means that the executable code it produces
is proved to behave exactly as prescribed by the semantics of
its corresponding source C program. In this case, a machine
32-bit integers instead of integer value belonging to Z, should
be considered. Once our obfuscations will be integrated into
CompCert, we will thus have for free a semantic preservation
theorem between an executable program and its corresponding
obfuscated program.
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